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Abstract
In this paper, we consider a duopoly competing in quantity, where
rms can invest in R&D to control their emissions. We distinguish be-
tween e¤orts carried out to acquire rst-hand knowledge (inventive R&D)
and e¤orts made to develop an absorptive capacity to be able to capture
part of the knowledge developed by the rival. There are also free R&D
spillovers between rms. We show that a regulator can reach the rst best
by using three regulatory instruments, which are a per-unit emissions tax,
a per-unit inventive-research subsidy and a per-unit absorptive-research
subsidy. The socially optimal R&D level for inventive research is higher
than the one for absorptive capacity, even when the investment-cost pa-
rameters for inventive and absorptive research are equal and when there
is both very little free spillover and a very high learning parameter. In-
terestingly, when the free spillover is high enough, the regulator gives a
greater per-unit subsidy to inventive research, and when it is low enough
and the marginal damage cost of pollution is su¢ ciently high, he supports
absorptive research to strengthen R&D spillovers. Moreover, inventive re-
search is actually taxed when the free spillover is low and the marginal
damage cost of pollution is high.
Key Words: Pollution Control; Inventive R&D; Absorptive Capac-
ity; Taxes and Subsidies; First Best.
1 Introduction
It is widely recognized that (i) the development and di¤usion of cleaner tech-
nologies play an important role in achieving environmental-quality goals; (ii)
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rms benet from each others investments in research and development (R&D)
through voluntary (e.g., joint ventures) and/or involuntary spillovers; and (iii)
regulators can inuence rmsR&D e¤orts toward emissions reduction through
economic incentives (e.g., taxes and subsidies). The aim of this paper is to
characterize the socially optimal production (or emissions) levels, investment in
inventive R&D (IR&D) and in absorptive R&D (AR&D), and tax and subsidy
rates in a game played by two polluting duopolists and a regulator.
One of the early studies in the environmental R&D area is Milliman and
Prince (1989). The authors considered a competitive industry formed of iden-
tical rms and evaluated the relative merits of di¤erent environmental-policy
instruments for promoting technological change in pollution control, namely, di-
rect controls, emissions subsidies, emissions taxes, free marketable permits, and
auctioned marketable permits. They showed that emissions taxes and auctioned
permits provide the highest rm incentives to promote technological change.
Jung, Krutilla and Boyd (1996) extended this comparative approach to a het-
erogeneous industry. Dosi and Moretto (1997) studied the regulation of a rm
that can switch to a green technology by incurring an irreversible investment
cost. This technological switch is expected to provide benets, but, however, is
surrounded by a certain degree of uncertainty. To bridge the gap between the
rms and the policy-makers desired timing of innovation, they recommended
that the regulator should stimulate the innovation through subsidies and by
reducing the uncertainty surrounding the protability of the new technology
through appropriate announcements. Farzin and Kort (2000) studied the reg-
ulation of a competitive rm and examined the e¤ect of a higher pollution-tax
rate on abatement investment, both under full certainty and when the timing
or the size of the tax increase is uncertain. They showed the possibility that a
higher pollution-tax rate induces more pollution and that a credible threat to
the acceleration of tax increase can lead to more abatement investment. Re-
quate and Unold (2003) investigated incentives given by environmental-policy
instruments to get rms to adopt advanced abatement technology. Fischer and
Newell (2008) assessed di¤erent policies for reducing carbon-dioxide emissions
and encouraging innovation and di¤usion of renewable energy. They evaluated
the relative performance of policies according to the incentives provided for
emissions reduction, e¢ ciency, and other outcomes. They also assessed how the
nature of technological progress through learning and R&D, and the degree of
knowledge spillovers, a¤ected the desirability of di¤erent policies. Because of
knowledge spillovers, the optimal policy involves a portfolio of di¤erent instru-
ments targeted at emissions, learning, and R&D. Ben Youssef (2009) considered
a non-cooperative and symmetric three-stage game played by two regulator-
rm hierarchies. He showed that R&D spillovers and the competition of rms
on the common market help non-cooperating countries to better internalize
transboundary pollution. Surprisingly, international competition increases the
per-unit emissions tax and decreases the per-unit R&D subsidy.
In the above literature, the assumption is either that there are no techno-
logical spillovers between the rms, or that when they occur, they are free. As
pointed out in many papers in the industrial-organization literature, this as-
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sumption may be strong in the sense that rms need to acquire an absorptive
capacity to assimilate and exploit the available information, to benet from
these technological spillovers.
Cohen and Levinthal (1989) were the rst to introduce the idea of absorptive
capacity in the (process or cost reduction) R&D literature. Contrary to the re-
sult achieved in the seminal paper by DAspremont and Jacquemin (1988,1990)
and the one by Kamien, Muller and Zang (1992), were R&D spillovers are
assumed exogenous and cost-free, Cohen and Levinthal showed that the in-
vestment in R&D develops the rms ability to identify, assimilate and exploit
knowledge from the environment. Kamien and Zang (2000) modeled a rms
e¤ectiveR&D level, which reects how both its R&D approach (rm-specic
or general) and R&D level inuence its absorptive capacity. They found
that, when rms cooperate in R&D, they choose identical R&D approaches.
When they do not form a research joint venture (RJV), they choose rm-specic
R&D approaches, unless there is no danger of exogenous spillovers. In contrast
to the nding in Kamien and Zang, Wiethaus (2005) showed that competing
rms choose identical R&D approaches in order to maximize the ow of knowl-
edge between them. Leahy and Neary (2007) specied a general model for
the absorptive-capacity process and showed that costly absorption raises the
e¤ectiveness of own R&D and lowers the e¤ective spillover coe¢ cient, thereby
weakening the case for encouraging RJVs even if there is total information-
sharing between rms. Hammerschmidt (2009) distinguished between two types
of R&D: inventive (or original) R&D that creates new knowledge and absorptive
R&D that enables a rm to benet from the inventive research conducted by
others. She showed that rms invest more in R&D to strengthen their absorptive
capacity when the spillover parameter is higher.
We consider a three-stage game consisting of a regulator and two identical
rms competing in quantity and producing the same homogeneous good. The
production process generates pollution and rms can invest in R&D to lower
their emissions/output ratio. Firms invest in IR&D that directly reduces their
emissions/output ratios. They also invest in AR&D, which enables a rm to
exploit the original research done by others. There are also free R&D spillovers
between rms. Since rms constitute a duopoly and pollute the environment,
they are regulated. In the rst stage, the regulator announces a tax per-unit
of pollution to induce the socially optimal level of pollution and production,
a subsidy per-unit of original research to induce the socially optimal level of
IR&D, and a subsidy per unit of absorptive-capacity research to induce the
socially optimal level of AR&D. In the second stage, rms invest in R&D, and
in the third one they compete in quantity on the product market.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the rst attempt to integrate into
the same model costly R&D spillovers and pollution control. We add costly
R&D spillovers to the environmental concern because the problem then bet-
ter conforms to real world regulatory policies as showed by the rich industrial
organization literature dealing with absorptive capacity.
Our main results are as follows:
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1. Using the three instruments, namely, the per-unit emissions tax, the per-
unit IR&D subsidy, and the per-unit AR&D subsidy, the regulator can
induce competing rms to implement the socially optimal levels of pro-
duction and research. These three instruments are necessary to our model.
Indeed, even if the socially optimal level of pollution can be implemented
through only one instrument, such as pollution permits, this does not pro-
vide an incentive for the rms to implement the socially optimal levels of
production and R&D.
2. Interestingly, the socially optimal level of IR&D is higher than the one for
AR&D even when the investment-cost parameters for IR&D and AR&D
are equal, the free spillover is zero, and the learning parameter is very high.
This result contradicts the simulation results in Hammerschmidt (2009)
where it is found that rms invest more in AR&D when the spillover
parameter is higher.
3. When the free spillover is su¢ ciently high, the regulator gives a higher per-
unit subsidy for original research; however, and interestingly, when it is low
enough and the marginal damage cost of pollution is su¢ ciently high, he
gives a higher per-unit subsidy for absorptive research to strengthen R&D
spillovers. This result contradicts the nding of Jin and Troege (2006)
who showed that, for the society and consumers, the marginal value of
innovation expenditure is always higher than that of imitation.
4. When the free spillover is low and the marginal damage cost of pollution
is high, the regulator really taxes IR&D. This constitutes an interesting
result from the environmental point of view since it holds only when the
environmental concern is important.
The paper has the following structure. Section 2 presents the model and
Section 3 studies the reaction of rms to the regulators policy. In Section
4, we derive the socially optimal regulatory instruments and we make some
comparisons between innovation and absorption. Section 5 concludes and an
Appendix contains some proofs.
2 The model
We consider an industry made up of two rms producing a homogeneous good
sold on a market having the following inverse demand function:
p(qi; qj) = a  (qi + qj); a > 0:
What justies the market structure we use is that the industries investing in
R&D are often characterized by oligopolistic structure.
The production process generates pollution and rms can invest in abate-
ment capacity to decrease their emissions per-unit of production. We suppose
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that this abatement capacity requires, and is positively related to, R&D ac-
tivities. We distinguish between two types of R&D e¤orts, namely, original or
inventive R&D, denoted xoi ; and absorptive-capacity R&D, denoted x
a
i . To bet-
ter visualize this, think of IR&D as activities related to, e.g., developing better
air-ltering systems, whereas AR&D corresponds to e¤orts dedicated to improv-
ing the rms technological-monitoring capacity through, e.g., hiring engineers
and technicians and buying information technology (IT) equipment. The total
knowledge available (also referred to as the e¤ective R&D level in the literature)
to rm i is:
xi = x
o
i + ( + lx
a
i )x
o
j ; (1)
where  2 [0; 1) is a parameter capturing the free and exogenous R&D spillover
and l > 0 is a learning or absorptive parameter. Since a rm cannot get as
research externality more than the original research developed by the competing
one, we impose the constraint 0   + lxai  1:
The above specication generalizes the one in DAspremont and Jacquemin
(1988, 1990) by the addition of a new component of spillover that is not free and
requires an investment in absorptive capacity. It di¤ers from Jin and Troege
(2006) and Hammerschmidt (2009), mainly by considering a component of free
spillover which is independent of absorptive capacity.
Denote by ei
 
xoi ; x
a
i ; x
o
j

the emissions per-unit of production. It is assumed
that ei
 
xoi ; x
a
i ; x
o
j

is decreasing in all its arguments. For simplicity, we adopt
the following functional form:1
ei(x
o
i ; x
a
i ; x
o
j) = 1  xoi   ( + lxai )xoj : (2)
Consequently, the total emissions by rm i are given by
Ei(qi; x
o
i ; x
a
i ; x
o
j) =

1  xoi   ( + lxai )xoj

qi:
The damage cost resulting from these emissions is given by Di = Ei, where
 > 0 is the marginal disutility of pollution.
We suppose that the cost of R&D activity of type m = o; a; given by
Cm (xmi ) ; are given by increasing convex functions satisfying C
m (0) = 0. Hence,
we have diminishing returns to scale of R&D. For tractability, we adopt the fol-
lowing quadratic functional forms:
Cm (xmi ) = k
m (xmi )
2
; km > 0; m = o; a;
1Actually, one rst needs to translate the R&D e¤ort into abatement. One easy way of
doing this is to suppose that
ei(x
o
i ; x
a
i ; x
o
j ) = e
0
i   fi
 
xoi ; x
a
i ; x
o
j

;
where e0i corresponds to the emissions per-unit of production in the absence of any abate-
ment e¤ort, and fi

xoi ; x
a
i ; x
o
j

is a function transforming R&D e¤ort into abatement. Our
formulation assumes
e0i = 1 and fi
 
xoi ; x
a
i ; x
o
j

= xoi + ( + lx
a
i )x
o
j :
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and make the following conjecture:
lim
ko;ka!+1
xoi = lim
ko;ka!+1
xai = 0: (3)
This intuitive conjecture simply states that when the investment-cost parame-
ters are relatively very high, it is optimal not to invest in R&D.
As rms constitute a polluting duopoly, they are regulated. The regula-
tor maximizes a social-welfare function and uses three regulatory instruments,
namely, an emissions tax per-unit of pollution t to induce the socially optimal
levels of production and pollution, a subsidy per-unit of IR&D ro and a subsidy
per-unit of AR&D ra to induce the socially optimal levels of e¤ective R&D and
emission/output ratio. Note that, as the game is symmetric, we conne our
interest to symmetric equilibria.
Denoting the constant marginal cost of production of rms by  > 0, the
prot of rm i is given by
i(qi; qj ; x
o
i ; x
a
i ) = p(qi; qj)qi   qi   ko (xoi )2   ka (xai )2 ;
and its net prot by
Vi(qi; qj ; x
o
i ; x
a
i ; x
o
j) = i   tEi + roxoi + raxai :
The consumer surplus corresponding to the consumption of Q = qi + qj is:
CS(qi; qj) =
Z qi+qj
0
p(u)du  p(qi; qj)(qi + qj) = 1
2
(qi + qj)
2: (4)
The social welfare is dened as the consumer surplus, minus damages and
subsidies, plus taxes and net prots of the rms, and is equal, after simplica-
tion, to
S(qi; qj ; x
o
i ; x
a
i ; x
o
j ; x
a
j ) = CS  Di  Dj +i +j : (5)
Notice that taxes and subsidies do not appear in the social welfare function
because we suppose that raising public funds is not costly. Indeed, taxes de-
ducted from the rmsprots are added to the consumer welfare, and subsidies
added to the rmsprots are deducted from the consumer welfare.
3 The reaction of rms
The game has three stages. In the rst stage, the regulator announces the
socially optimal per-unit emissions tax and per-unit R&D subsidies, i.e., the
triplet (t; ro; ra). In the second stage, the rms choose their levels of R&D,
and, nally, in stage 3, the rms select their production levels. To determine a
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, we solve the game backward.
In the third stage, the rmsrst-order conditions are:
@Vi
@qi
=
@Vj
@qj
= 0: (6)
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Solving the system (6) leads to
qi =
1
3

a     t  1  2    + lxaj xoi + [1  2 ( + lxai )]xoj : (7)
To interpret the above functions, we compute their partial derivatives and
consider the case of a positive emissions tax. When a rm increases its level of
original or absorptive research, its emissions/output ratio decreases (see (2)),
enabling it to expand its production ( @q

i
@xoi
= t3 [2   ( + lxaj )] > 0 and @q

i
@xai
=
2
3 tlx
o
j > 0). Consider now the derivative
@qi
@xoj
= t3 [2( + lx
a
i )   1]. When the
competing rm increases its original research xoj , then this has two opposite
e¤ects on the rms production, namely, (i) a positive e¤ect on production due
to the free R&D spillovers and absorptive capacity; and (ii) a negative e¤ect due
to competition between rms. (Recall that this is a model à la Cournot where
outputs are strategic substitutes.) When  and/or l are high enough, the rst
positive e¤ect dominates. When a competitor increases its absorptive capacity,
its emissions ratio decreases, enabling it to expand its production, which in turn
forces the other rm to reduce its production ( @q

i
@xaj
=   t3 lxoi < 0).
The symmetric optimal level of production for each rm is obtained from
expression (7):
q =
1
3
(a     t [1  xo   ( + lxa)xo]) : (8)
The rst-order conditions of rm is second stage are:2
dVi
dxoi
=
@qi
@xoi
@Vi
@qi
+
@qj
@xoi
@Vi
@qj
+
@Vi
@xoi
= 0; (9)
dVi
dxai
=
@qi
@xai
@Vi
@qi
+
@qj
@xai
@Vi
@qj
+
@Vi
@xai
= 0: (10)
At equilibrium, by using (6), (9)-(10) are simplied, and the following equations
are satised for symmetric solution(s):3
2
3
t (2     lxa) q   2koxo + ro = 0; (11)
4
3
tlxoq   2kaxa + ra = 0; (12)
2The second-order conditions are veried in the Appendix when ko and ka are high enough.
It is important to realize that we do not consider the case ko; ka ! +1 in this paper.
Nevertheless, we use these limits for comparisons that still remain valid when koand ka are
nite and su¢ ciently high numbers. For example, if
lim
ko;ka!+1
f(ko; ka) > lim
ko;ka!+1
g(ko; ka);
this implies that there are nite numbers, say Ko and Ka; such that for any ko > Ko and
ka > Ka, we have f(ko; ka) > g(ko; ka).
3We look for symmetric equilibria because the model is symmetric and for tractability.
Further, as will be made clear in the following section, the backward resolution of the game
is stopped at the second stage, which explains why it is appropriate to look for symmetric
equilibria at this second stage.
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where q is given by (8).
In the next section, we will show how a suitable choice of policy instruments
by the regulator induces the rms to select the socially optimal production and
R&D levels, which are at the same time the unique solution to the non-linear
equations system (11)-(12).
4 The socially optimal regulatory instruments
In the rst stage, the regulator maximizes his social welfare, given by (5), with
respect to the decision variables t; ro and ra. Note that solving directly for the
optimal per-unit emissions tax and per-unit R&D subsidies, is an extremely
hard problem. Therefore, we propose an indirect (and much simpler) method
in which the regulator maximizes, in the third and second stages respectively,
his social welfare with respect to the output and the R&D levels which become
the new choice variables. Then, by equalizing the socially optimal quantities to
those selected by the rms, the regulator determines the socially optimal per-
unit emissions tax and per-unit R&D subsidies. In fact, the model is solved as
if it were a two-stage game.
Since the regulator will look for the symmetric socially optimal quantities,
the social-welfare function given by (5) is written as S(q; xo; xa): The rst-order
condition of the regulators third stage is:
@S
@q
= 0: (13)
Solving the above equation gives the symmetric socially-optimal level of pro-
duction for each rm:
q^ =
1
2
[a     +  (1 +  + lxa)xo] : (14)
A su¢ cient condition for symmetric production quantities to be positive is:
 < a  ; (15)
that is, the marginal damage cost of pollution is lower than the maximum
willingness to pay for the good minus its marginal cost of production. We
assume from now on that this condition is fullled.
The rst-order conditions of the regulators second stage are:4
dS
dxo
=
@q^
@xo
@S
@q
+
@S
@xo
= 0; (16)
dS
dxa
=
@q^
@xa
@S
@q
+
@S
@xa
= 0: (17)
4The second-order conditions are veried in the Appendix when ko and ka are high enough.
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At equilibrium, by using condition (13), equations (16)-(17) are simplied,
and their symmetric solution(s) verify the following equations system:
 (1 +  + lxa) q^   2koxo = 0; (18)
lxoq^   2kaxa = 0; (19)
where q^ is given by (14), and (18) and (19) are equivalent to
 (1 +  + lxa) [a     +  (1 +  + lxa)xo]  4koxo = 0; (20)
lxo [a     +  (1 +  + lxa)xo]  4kaxa = 0: (21)
Solving the non-linear system (20)-(21) gives the symmetric socially-optimal
R&D levels denoted by x^o and x^a: Unfortunately, we are not able to get an
explicit solution. Nevertheless, we will prove the existence of a positive one.
Proposition 1 When ko and ka are high enough, there are at least one and at
most ve couple of real solutions x^o > 0 and x^a > 0 that solve the non-linear
equations system given by (20) and (21); these symmetric solutions maximize
the social-welfare function.
Proof. See Appendix.
The above proposition shows the possibility of multiple symmetric equilibria
maximizing the social-welfare level. The regulator have to select one of them.
Condition (15) and the assumption in (3) guarantee that the symmetric
socially optimal levels of research, production and pollution are positive, and
that 0   + l x^a  1; when ko and ka are high enough.
From (18) and (19), we can show that
x^o =
s
ka(1 + )
kol
+
ka
ko
x^a

x^a: (22)
Proposition 2 It holds that:
(i) If ka > ko, or if l is low enough, then x^o > x^a:
(ii) If ka < koand l is high enough, then x^a > x^o:
Proof. See Appendix.
This proposition carries on interesting results. For ka > ko one expects, to
obtain x^o > x^a. Similarly, if the absorption parameter is too low to allow the
rm to benet from the competitors R&D, then it makes sense to focus on
IR&D. Interestingly, even when ka = ko; it still holds true that the rm will
invest more in IR&D than in AR&D. Indeed, suppose that ka = ko; the free
spillover  is zero, and the learning parameter l is very high. In this context,
it seems intuitive to expect the socially optimal AR&D level to be higher than
the IR&D level. However, we get the opposite result. One explanation is that
a higher learning parameter directly increases the e¢ ciency of the investment
in AR&D and indirectly increases the e¢ ciency of the investment in IR&D (see
expression (1)). Further note that the rst result in (i) holds for any value
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of l, and in particular for a high one. In this case, our result contradicts the
one found by simulation in Hammerschmidt (2009) where it is shown that rms
invest more in AR&D when the spillover parameter is higher. The result in (ii),
stating that x^a > x^o when ka < ko and l is high enough, is intuitive.
The non-linear system (11)-(12) involves two equations and two unknown
variables, which are the optimal symmetric R&D levels for the rms and are
denoted by xo and xa. Since the emissions tax and R&D subsidies are set to
induce rms to achieve the socially optimal production and R&D levels, then
the optimal emissions tax and R&D subsidies should be chosen such that x^o and
x^a chosen by the regulator are the solution to the equations system (11)-(12).
Therefore, from (8), (11) and (12), we have:
t =
a     3q^
1  (1 +  + lx^a)x^o ; (23)
ro = 2kox^o   2
3
t(2     lx^a)q^; (24)
ra = 2kax^a   4
3
tlx^oq^: (25)
Thus, we can establish the following proposition:
Proposition 3 The regulator can induce rms to implement the rst-best lev-
els of production and R&D by using the three regulatory instruments, namely
a per-unit emissions tax, a per-unit original-research subsidy and a per-unit
absorptive-research subsidy.
From (20) and (21), we can show that
lim
ko;ka!+1
kox^o =
1
4
(1 + )(a     ); lim
ko;ka!+1
kax^a = 0: (26)
From (14) and (23), we have
lim
ko;ka!+1
t =
1
2
[3  (a  )] < 0,  < a  
3
:
Therefore, when the marginal damage of pollution is high enough, the regulator
taxes pollution and when it is low enough, he actually subsidizes production to
deal with the duopoly distortion.
By using (14), (26), (24) and (25), we deduce:
lim
ko;ka!+1
ro =
1
2
(a     )

(2   1)+ (2  )
3
(a  )

; (27)
lim
ko;ka!+1
ra = 0: (28)
The following proposition compares the subsidy rates for e¤orts in original and
absorptive-capacity R&D.
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Proposition 4 When koand ka are high enough, then:
(i) ro > ra, for   1=5; or  < 1=5 and  is low enough;
(ii) ro < ra, for  < 1=5 and  is high enough.
Proof. See Appendix.
The results in the above proposition are to some extent unexpected. Indeed,
consider the case where the free spillover  is zero, l is close to zero, and the
marginal damage cost of pollution is high. In this case, where free spillover
is absent and spillover benets are nearly absent, we expect the regulator to
subsidize original research at a higher rate to prevent environmental damage.
The result in item (ii) is actually showing the reverse. This result is very
interesting from the environmental point of view. To summarize, the subsidy
policy of the regulator consists in trying to induce a minimum level of R&D
externalities. Indeed, when the free spillover is high enough, he supports original
research, and when it is low enough and the marginal damage of pollution is
su¢ ciently high, he supports absorptive research.
Since limko;ka!+1 ra = 0, from Proposition 4, we can know when the sub-
sidy for original research is positive or negative (in such a case the regulator
actually taxes IR&D). Indeed, when the free spillover is high enough, original
research is subsidized. When the free spillover and the marginal damage cost
of pollution are low enough, we know that the regulator subsidizes production;
this may induce rms to underinvest in IR&D with respect to the socially opti-
mal level, and that is why it is subsidized; however, when the marginal damage
cost of pollution is high enough, pollution is taxed which may induce rms to
overinvest in IR&D, and that is why it is actually taxed.
5 Conclusion
We consider a duopoly competing in quantity where rms can invest in both
original (inventive) and absorptive R&D to control their emissions of pollution.
Our objective is to compare the socially optimal R&D levels for original and
absorptive research, and to study the behavior of the regulator with regard to
these two types of research.
We show that the regulator can induce rms to implement the rst best
levels of production and R&D by means of three instruments: a tax per-unit
of pollution, a subsidy per-unit of inventive R&D and a subsidy per-unit of ab-
sorptive R&D. Interestingly, the socially optimal R&D level for original research
is higher than the one for absorptive capacity when the investment-cost para-
meters are equal, the free spillover is zero and the learning parameter is very
high. One explanation is that a higher absorptive parameter directly increases
the e¢ ciency of the investment in absorptive R&D and indirectly increases the
e¢ ciency of the investment in inventive R&D.
Surprisingly, when the free spillover is equal to zero, the marginal damage
cost of pollution is high enough and the learning parameter is close to zero, it
is expected that the regulator would subsidize original research at a higher rate
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to prevent environmental damage, but we obtain the opposite result. In fact,
through his subsidy policy and in presence of the possibility to invest in absorp-
tive research, the regulator tries to induce a minimum level of R&D externalities.
Indeed, when the free spillover is high enough, he gives a higher per-unit subsidy
to inventive research, and when it is low enough and the marginal damage cost
of pollution is su¢ ciently high, he gives a higher per-unit subsidy to absorptive
research Moreover, the investment in inventive R&D is actually taxed when
the free spillover is su¢ ciently low and the marginal damage cost of pollution is
high enough. Clearly, these two last results holding for high marginal damage
cost are interesting from the environmental point of view.
6 Appendix
A) Firmssecond-order conditions of the second stage
Consider the Hessian Matrix:
HV =
 
d2Vi
dxo2i
d2Vi
dxoi dx
a
i
d2Vi
dxoi dx
a
i
d2Vi
dxa2i
!
By using the rst-order conditions given by (9)-(10), we can determine the
second derivatives constituting matrix HV which can be written as:
HV =

g1   2ko g2
g2 g3   2ka

;
where gi; i = 1; 2; 3 are polynomial functions in t; xoand xa (symmetric case).
As limko;ka!+1 x^o, limko;ka!+1 x^a and limko;ka!+1 t are nite numbers,
then gi take nite values when ko and ka tend to +1.
Therefore, when ko and ka are su¢ ciently high:
i) d
2Vi
dxo2i
< 0 and d
2Vi
dxa2i
< 0;
ii) detHV = (g1   2ko)(g3   2ka)  g22 > 0:
Therefore, we have a maximum when ko and ka are high enough.
B) Regulators second-order conditions of the second stage
Consider the Hessian Matrix:
HS =
 
d2S
dxo2
d2S
dxodxa
d2S
dxodxa
d2S
dxa2
!
By using the rst-order conditions given by (16)-(17), we can compute the
second derivatives constituting matrix HS which can be written as:
HS =

f1   4ko f2
f2 f3   4ka

;
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where fi, i = 1; 2; 3; are polynomial functions in xo and xa. Since limko;ka!+1 x^o =
limko;ka!+1 x^a = 0; then fi take nite values when ko and ka tend to +1:
Therefore, when ko and ka are high enough:
i) f1   4ko < 0 and f3   4ka < 0,
ii) detHS = (f1   4ko)(f3   4ka)  f22 > 0.
Thus, we have a maximum when ko and ka are su¢ ciently high.
C) Proof of Proposition 1
Expression (20) can be developed as:
(1+)(a  )+2(1+)2xo+l [a     + 2(1 + )xo]xa+2l2xo(xa)2 4koxo = 0
(29)
From (21), we have:
xa =
l [a     + (1 + )xo]xo
4ka   2l2xo2 : (30)
By using the expression of xa given by (30) in (29) and then multiplying by 
4ka   2l2xo22, we get a polynomial function of degree 5 in xo: Q(xo) = 0:
The coe¢ cient of xo5 is  44l4ko, and the constant term is 16(1 + )(a 
   )ka2.
Since Q(0) > 0 and limxo!+1Q(xo) =  1 , then Q(xo) admits at least
one real and positive root x^o > 0, and admits at most ve roots. Because of
(3), (15) and (30), x^a > 0 when ko and ka are high enough.
D) Proof of Proposition 2
From expression (22), we deduce the following:
i) If ko  ka, then x^o > x^a.
ii) If ka < ko, then
x^o < x^a , k
a (1 +  + lx^a)
kol
< x^a , x^a > k
a (1 + )
(ko   ka) l :
If l is high enough, then x^o < x^a. If l is low enough, then it is the other way
around (x^o > x^a).
E) Proof of Proposition 4
From (27) and (28):
limko;ka!+1 ro > limko;ka!+1 ra , (2   1)+ 2 3 (a  ) > 0:
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i) The above inequality is always satised when  > 1=2...
ii) Suppose that  < 1=2;
 limko;ka!+1 ro > limko;ka!+1 ra ,  < 2 3(1 2) (a  ); because of condition
15, this last inequality is always veried when   1=5, and when  < 1=5,
we need  to be su¢ ciently low.
 limko;ka!+1 ro < limko;ka!+1 ra ,  > 2 3(1 2) (a  ); this last inequality
is not in contradiction with (15) when  < 1=5.
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